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1. The Fair Innings Argument and the Complete-Life View 
 
The Fair Innings Argument (hereafter the FIA) appeals to the intuitively plausible 
idea  that  there  is  a  certain  lifespan  that  we  should  each  reasonably  expect  to 
achieve, and that it is unfair if purely because of the structure and arrangements of 
society people do not enjoy that span of life. John Harris describes the FIA as an 
attempt to: 
 
capture and express in a workable form the truth that while it is always a mis-
fortune to die when one wants to go on living, it is not a tragedy to die in old 
age; but it is … both a tragedy and a misfortune to be cut off prematurely.
1 
 
So the injustice experienced by someone who has not had a good innings when 
they lose out to someone who has is significantly greater than in the reverse cir-
cumstances. This greater injustice arguably gives us a normative reason to with-
hold  life-saving  medical  benefits  from  an  older  person,  and  to  give  them  to  a 
younger one, in situations where both need the same treatment in order to survive, 
but where scarcity dictates that only one can receive it. Harris therefore outlines 
what he calls “a reasonable form” of the FIA in the following way: 
 
The FIA: that people  who had achieved old age or  who  were closely ap-
proaching it would not have their lives further prolonged when this could on-
ly be achieved at the cost of the lives of those who were not nearing old age.
2 
 
The FIA is a philosophical argument that has obvious advantages for those 
who must make rationing decisions in the distribution of health services as well as 
other instances of intergenerational justice involving the distribution of benefits RICHARD WAGLAND  2 
between age groups or generations, and it is unsurprisingly one that has been often 
used.
3 There is much evidence that discrimination against the old is prevalent with-
in healthcare, and groups such as Age Concern and the King ’s Fund often claim 
that this is not so much motivated by notions of fairness as by moral prejudice 
against the old.
4 It is of course difficult to assess the degree to which those who 
defend age discrimination on the basis of moral reasons like fairness and justice are 
in fact motivated primarily by p rejudice, but to have a moral reason for doing 
something that you would like to do for immoral reasons is of obvious ben efit to 
those who are prejudiced. This chapter, however, is not about motives but about 
the FIA as an argument. 
There are obviously strong similarities between this attempt to justify ageism 
through the FIA and the justification via the complete-life view (CLV) discussed in 
the previous chapter. At first glance it would seem reasonable to suggest that we 
could simultaneously support both principles. Ronald Dworkin, for example, is, as 
we have seen, explicit in his commitment to the CLV within his political philos o-
phy,
5 but he also implicitly embraces the justice of the FIA in his moral theory, 
when he outlines what he calls the “frustration thesis”: the “instinctive assumption 





2. Interpreting the Two Views 
 
It is difficult sometimes to determine whether the advocacy of age discrimination 
in any particular instance is based upon the CLV or the FIA. An example is Daniel 
Callahan’s book Setting Limits,
7 which outlines a defense of age discrimination in 
healthcare based upon the premise that the old should be willing to give up access 
to life-extending medical treatments so that the young might have the greatest o p-
portunity of becoming old. He argues that “[t]here is nothing unfair about using 
age as a [discriminatory] category if the purpose of doing so is to achieve equity 
between generations.”
8 However, it is ambiguous as to whether Callahan is appeal-
ing to a CLV or an FIA in his defense of age discrimination, or whether he is rely-
ing upon some other principle. For example, he appears to be defending the CLV 
when he argues that beyond a certain point in their lives elderly people “will have 
already had their fair share of resources,”
9 and will not be entitled to any more re-
sources on the grounds of fairness. On the other hand, he appears to be defending 
the FIA when he proposes that “[a]fter a person has lived out a natural life span, 
medical care should no longer be orientated to resisting death,” and that it would 
henceforth “be limited to the relief of suffering.”
10 As we will see below, however, A Fair Innings or a Complete Life 
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these two claims may conflict, and a “fair share of resources” may not have been 
exhausted by the time a “person has lived out a natural life span.” 
Both  justifications  of  ageism  are  concerned  with  the  distribution  of  some 
good, and both would seem to be strongly normatively egalitarian. They both hold 
that if there is something to be distributed then ideally it should be distributed fair-
ly, which is usually taken to mean as equally as possible. As the previous chapter 
has shown, within the work of egalitarian liberals the CLV is concerned with the 
distribution of either resources or welfare. While welfare can be understood as an 
intrinsic good, as an end in itself, resources are viewed as instrumental goods, or 
the means to achieve our ends. The FIA may also be interpreted in either of two 
ways. First, it may be a view about the distribution of the instrumental means to 
ensure the end of a “fair” duration of life. If so, the FIA would be a view concern-
ing the means to an end in a way similar to the resource-egalitarian interpretation 
of the CLV. The difference between the two is perhaps that the means interpreta-
tion of the FIA would be more specifically limited to healthcare and medical re-
sources. Understood in this way, the FIA becomes relevant only in circumstances 
of scarcity, as when only one of two persons can be saved with the limited re-
sources available. 
An alternative view of the FIA would be to interpret it as concerned with the 
end itself, and so be concerned to ensure that each person has a fair or an equal 
share of life itself. Such an ends interpretation of the FIA would be similar to the 
welfare-egalitarian view of the CLV. Oliver Leaman is one commentator who has 
interpreted the FIA in this way and, as he recognizes, there are somewhat implau-
sible implications of this more extreme version of the FIA: 
 
There are interesting consequences to [this interpretation of] the “fair innings 
argument.” One is that it involves an extreme form of egalitarianism. The fact 
that someone lives longer than someone else is regarded as patently unfair, 




If the FIA is a normative principle that each of us should have equal  life 
spans, then just as it is “unfair” that some people die young, so too would it be un-
fair that some people live longer than their fair share. The implication is that some-
thing should be done to correct this unfairness, perhaps through a policy of en-
forced  euthanasia  for  all  those  who  have  lived  beyond  the  socially  determined 
“fair” innings. 
The first interpretation of the FIA identified above, that which identifies it 
with a view about means rather than ends, does not suffer from this morally im-RICHARD WAGLAND  4 
plausible implication, and it would remain silent on the issue of the actual life 
spans that different people achieved above the fair innings. It is silent on this be-
cause the view does not concern itself directly with distributing the ends, but only 
with means. Once the healthcare and medical resources have been directed to en-
sure everyone has an equal opportunity to reach a fair innings, then the actual in-
nings people enjoy is left unchallenged. 
To complicate the issue further, the distinction between whether the FIA dis-
tributes means or ends is not the only one that can be made. Like the CLV, the FIA 
may be interpreted as a principle of strict equality, priority, or sufficiency. As indi-
cated above, Leaman interprets the FIA to involve “an extreme form of egalitarian-
ism,” and this implies that its underlying normative principle is that we should 
each have the same length of life. A world in which everyone had exactly the same 
length of life would in a sense be fairer than one in which everyone lived to the fair 
innings but some lived much longer. Such an ideal world of equal lifespans would 
also be administratively more efficient because we would then be able to allocate 
exactly the right amount of resources for each life. However, this ideal is not an 
appealing one, because most people would not find it desirable to know exactly 
how long they had to live. Arguably what gives life much of its meaning and en-
joyment is the very uncertainty of its duration. If we each knew we had an equal 
life span then as we neared the end of the innings we would become increasingly 
worried and distracted from the important things in life. Moreover, such a strict 
egalitarian view of the FIA would be subject to the objection that it was committed 
to “leveling down” the goods being distributed. If inequality is intrinsically bad 
and the goods being distributed are life itself, then Leaman would be right in think-
ing that the FIA would inherently require an older person to give up her remaining 
years simply because she was older.
12 Therefore, if the basis of the FIA is the ideal 
that our lives should be of equal length, it is not a plausible argument. 
However, Leaman’s interpretation is not the only possible one. An alternative 
interpretation is the prioritarian one, that when there are two people who need the 
same medical resources in order to survive, one of them being nearer “old age” 
than the other, and only one “package” of resources is available, we should give it 
to the younger one. But by itself the prioritarian FIA is also implausible. If we are 
always to prioritize the younger person, we will have to maintain, for example, that 
it is better to save a thirty year old than a forty year old, or even a thirty-five year 
old than a thirty-six year old. Harris finds such a choice invidious because neither 
person has had their fair innings.
13 What is also required, then, is some decision 
about exactly what length of life is “fair,” which can of course only be arbitrary. 
So, we might more plausibly think of the FIA as a combination of a prioritarian 
and a sufficiency view: the view that people should, as far as possible, be guaran-A Fair Innings or a Complete Life 
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teed a minimum length of life, and that society should prioritize those who have so 
far not enjoyed that sufficiency at the expense of those who have. This combined 
view  of  the  FIA  would  not  be  subject  to  the  more  obvious  criticisms  outlined 




3. The CLV and FIA in Conflict 
 
We can therefore think of the most plausible interpretation of the FIA as being a 
view that is concerned about means (resources) instead of ends (life itself), and a 
view that is guided by a principle of priority constrained by a sufficiency minimum 
(a threshold length of life that is deemed fair). However, although both the FIA in 
this formulation and the CLV are views about the just distribution of resources that 
require some of those resources to be withheld from the old (however defined) and 
given to the young, the two views have different implications. One reason for this 
is that while personal responsibility is both presupposed by, and a consequence of, 
the CLV, it is not necessary to the FIA. The CLV requires us to distribute re-
sources so that each person has an equal share over the course of their complete 
lives, so that the more prudently individuals use those resources the longer they 
will last. In contrast, the FIA distributes resources only in such a way as to ensure 
that people have as fair an innings as possible; it is irrelevant how irresponsible a 
younger person has been about their health, or how prudent an older person has 
been. The younger person may have smoked and drunk heavily, had a poor diet 
and taken no exercise, while the older person has lived healthily, but if the FIA 
merely involves a claim that individuals are all entitled to a certain number of 
years of life, then it will nevertheless penalize the prudent older person.  
In answer to this criticism we might adapt the FIA so that instead of applying 
to all persons it might instead only be used as a “tie breaker” between two equally 
deserving people. If so, then, the level of personal responsibility that each individ-
ual had taken within their lives would be relevant. If they were equally deserving 
then responsibility would not be an issue, because if equally deserving they would 
have been equally responsible. The tie-breaking FIA would then only be used to 
discriminate in favor of a younger person in situations where two people, one older 
than the other, had been equally responsible for their health over their respective 
lives (always supposing that such a test could be made). However, it might be ar-
gued that in such a situation the older person has in fact been the more responsible 
because  they  have  been  so  for  longer.  We  can  imagine  a  situation  in  which  a 
younger person receives a scarce resource instead of the older person because she RICHARD WAGLAND  6 
had at the time been deemed equally deserving and responsible to an older person, 
but who had then immediately become dissolute. By the time she reaches the same 
age that the disfavored older person had been when discriminated against, the now 
dissolute younger individual can certainly not be said to be equally deserving. So 
with hindsight we see that we ought to have given the resource to the older candi-
date after all. It does not seem absurd to suggest, therefore, that if to be equally 
deserving means being equally responsible for your health, then individuals should 
also be of equal age and so have been equally deserving or responsible for equally 
long. In such a case, however, the FIA would obviously be redundant because both 
individuals would have enjoyed an equal innings if not a fair one. The tie-breaking 
adaptation of the FIA therefore fails, and the criticism that the FIA ignores person-
al responsibility holds.  
A comparison with the CLV, illustrated in the diagram below, expresses this 
criticism of the FIA. We can use the diagram to imagine two persons of differing 
ages, A and B, living simultaneously at T4 and both in need of a medical resource 
to prolong their lives into T5, but which, due to circumstances of scarcity, only one 
can have. The numbers for A and B at each temporal segment indicate the level of 
unhealthy living to which they have each subjected their bodies. If we imagine that 
the higher the number the more unhealthy the lifestyle (the more cigarettes they 
have smoked, alcohol they have drunk, saturated fat they have eaten, and the less 
exercise taken) then we can see that person A has been far less responsible in his 
shorter life than B has been in her longer life. Nevertheless, this is irrelevant from 
the perspective of the FIA. Any available resources will be directed toward the 
irresponsible person A to keep him alive as long as possible to ensure he reaches a 
fair innings, and the fact that B has taken care of her health throughout her life 
counts for nothing. 
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A second criticism often leveled at the FIA is that some of the elderly who 
have perhaps lived hard lives when they were young may have had much less en-
joyment in their lives than some younger people have, and could claim in a real 
sense that they have not yet “had their life” or “their fair share.”
14 We can again 
use the figure above to examine this criticism. In this instance the numbers indicate 
the quantity of resources that each person has spent or has had spent on them at 
each temporal period. Person A is only half the age of B but although he is only 
now coming toward the end of his youth he has used a great deal more resources in 
his short life than B has in her long life. Person B has therefore had a hard life and 
in one sense can be said not to have enjoyed as much life as person A. She may 
nevertheless have another couple of decades of life if she is given the medical re-
source they both need for survival. 
As far as the FIA is concerned the person who has either achieved or is ap-
proaching old age should not have her life further prolonged when this could only 
be achieved at the cost of those who are not nearing old age. So, on the view of the 
FIA, person A would be saved and B would be sacrificed, even though his com-
plete life share of resources will be far greater, simply because he is not yet nearing 
old age. By contrast, the CLV requires that the shares of resources that people en-
joy over the course of their lives should be equal. As person B has enjoyed signifi-
cantly less than A in this instance, any further resources should be channeled to-
ward B rather than A. The CLV takes into consideration the past resources that 
each person has enjoyed while the FIA only counts life time. Moreover, B’s claim 
to further resources would be further strengthened from the perspective of the CLV 
if we were to consider the projected resources or welfare that each person is likely 
to enjoy in the next temporal segment (T5). The possibility that A might consume 
any more resources would mean that the complete life inequality between the two 
people would be widened further, and this would be unacceptable. 
A third common criticism of the FIA is that the old have earned a right to be 
treated before the young because they will have paid more in national insurance 
contributions over their lives, and so will have contributed toward both their own 
old age and those who were members of the old age group before them. Again the 
FIA is unconcerned about this previous investment and is only concerned with the 
actual ages of persons, but how is this issue treated by the CLV? At first glance it 
may seem that the CLV would ignore this issue as well because the view is solely 
concerned with the fair distribution of resources to the complete lives of individu-
als, and it stipulates that what people are entitled to is a relatively equal share of 
these. By itself the CLV would indicate that if someone, like Person B in the above 
example, distributed their resources in a prudent way over the temporal stages of 
their lives, then until they had used up those resources, they would always be enti-RICHARD WAGLAND  8 
tled to further claims irrespective of their age. If I start out with an equal complete 
life of resources and then invest them carefully, adding to that investment from the 
income I receive through life, then I will be able to buy significantly more benefits 
in old age than if I had been profligate. The CLV by itself does not explain how 
this can be done. For this reason, as outlined in the previous chapter, the CLV has 
been combined with a prudential analogy (PA) by several political philosophers,
15 
and this hypothetical thought experiment is used to show what justice requires s o-
ciety to spend on the well-being of its citizens at the various stages of their lives. 
The combination of the CLV and a PA is therefore able to address the challenge 
that the FIA ignores: that the cumulative contributions of people through out their 
lives give them certain claims of justice that younger people do not possess.  
So, although the FIA and CLV both justify age discrimination, they can each 
be interpreted in different  ways, and the implications of each view might co nflict 
with the implications of the other. However, although the two views differ, a fully 
adequate anti-ageist argument would need to identify a common reason that a c-
counts for the wrongfulness of both ageis t justifications. This is the object of the 
final section of this chapter. 
 
 
4. Challenging Age Discrimination 
 
As Geoffrey Cupit notes, “the alleged injustice of age discrimination presents a 
puzzle,”  because  the  “standard  argument  against  discrimination—the  argument 
from equalizing benefits—seems not to apply.”
16 It does not apply because, as we 
have  seen,  equalizing  benefits  between  the  complete  lives  of  separate  persons 
might actually justify age discrimination rather than challenge it. It does this for the 
obvious fact that each of us has a turn to be old, and, by taking turns to be well-off 
or badly off, temporal or synchronic inequalities will even out over the course of 
people’s complete lives. It is this simple intuitive idea that lends discrimination on 
the basis of age the significant moral plausibility it enjoys. It means that age dis-
crimination can be defended as fair because it treats everyone the same over their 
complete lives, and it can even be said to be in everyone’s interests. It is not there-
fore surprising that, as Age Concern has claimed, the anti-ageist argument is a po-
sition which has “been much less widely articulated or disseminated” than defenses 
of ageism.
17 
Nevertheless, there have been several attempts to make intelligible the intu i-
tion that age discrimination is unjust. Cupit, for example, develops an argument to 
express the anti-ageist intuition that is based upon the notion of status.
18 He claims 
that each of us has an equal moral status and that the injustice of age discrimination A Fair Innings or a Complete Life 
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has its real source in that equal status not being respected throughout a person’s 
life. So age discrimination is not a comparative injustice in the same way as sexism 
and racism are, and the injustice it involves is not in the inappropriate treatment of 
some people in comparison to others, but as far as it is comparative, in the inap-
propriate treatment of people in comparison to their earlier (or later) selves. While 
defining status is a complex issue, what Cupit’s argument implies is that age dis-
crimination is wrong because it treats persons differently at one point in their lives 
to the way they are treated at another point. 
Another  defense  of  the  anti-ageist  position  has  been  presented  by  Dennis 
McKerlie, who attempts to preserve an appeal to the normative principle of equal-
izing benefits. However, rather than equalizing benefits over the complete lives of 
separate individuals, McKerlie believes  we should, at least on  some occasions, 
seek to equalize as far as possible the synchronic parts of people’s lives. In his 
most recent article McKerlie refines his position from synchronic egalitarianism to 
a synchronic priority view, and he suggests rather that we should prioritize those 
individuals who are worst off at the time, irrespective of the level of resources they 
have enjoyed in the past.
19 
McKerlie supports his position by imagining two scenarios in which he b e-
lieves it would be morally more plausible to be concerned about the synchronic 
interests of an older person than a younger one. In the first exampl e, McKerlie be-
lieves we would prefer to help an old person who is very badly off  instead of 
someone younger and better off, even if it is clear that the actual benefit for the 
older person’s well-being would be smaller than the benefit to that of the younger 
person. If one person is presently fairly well off, it would seem odd that we should 
prefer to give him a larger benefit than to give a poorer person a smaller benefit. 
The reason it would seem odd must partly be explained by the fact that we can 
identify with the synchronic interests of the older person who is now in greater 
need. In a second scenario, McKerlie argues that we would prefer to help an old 
person who is very badly off rather than a younger person who is badly off, yet not 
as badly off, even though the older person has already consumed more resources 
than the younger person is likely to do in his life. When we are dealing with moral-
ly urgent claims of justice it does seem plausible that we would not be primarily 
concerned with the total level of benefits someone has or is likely to enjoy over 
their complete lives. 
Both Cupit and McKerlie are responding to the age discrimination inherent 
within the CLV. However, John Harris has articulated what is probably still the 
best “anti-ageist argument” in regard to the FIA, which denies absolutely the rele-
vance of age as a criterion of discrimination within the distribution of healthcare 
resources.
20 This anti-ageist argument claims that there is something that each of us RICHARD WAGLAND  10 
values equally no matter how old we are, which is to say “the rest of our lives.” So 
long as we do not know the date of our deaths, then for each of us the rest of our 
lives is of indefinite duration, and we each suffer the same injustice if our wishes 
to continue living are deliberately frustrated. Harris believes that: 
 
the anti-ageist argument has much plausibility. It locates the wrongfulness of 
ending an individual’s life in the evil of thwarting that person’s desire to go 
on living and argues that it is profoundly unjust to frustrate that desire merely 
because  some  of  those  who  have  exactly  the  same  desire,  held  no  more 
strongly, also have a longer life expectancy than others.
21 
 
Each of these three anti-ageist defenses appeals to the idea that people not on-
ly have diachronic interests with regards to a fair lifespan or to an equal lifetime 
share of benefits or opportunity, but that people also have synchronic interests that 
are both morally significant and that are not reducible to their diachronic interests. 
Indeed, the two kinds of  interests may conflict.
22 The idea that each person has 
irreducible and morally significant synchronic interests gives us a reason to be 
concerned about any policy that leads to differential treatment for the old that  is 
solely based upon chronological age. If each person has the same fundamental syn-
chronic interests that demand equal treatment irrespective of age, then justice r e-
quires a balancing of the synchronic interests of different people of diffe rent ages 
on an equal footing. Policies which neglect o r violate those interests du ring any 
part of a person’s life on the basis of something as arbitrary as age are thereby un-
just.  For  Cupit  and  McKerlie  these  fundamental  synchronic  interests  would  be 
those that each of us have in enjoying a minimally decent life at each temporal 
moment of that life. Harris, on the other hand, effectively argues that we each have 
a synchronic interest in living out whatever life we still have. Looking at the prob-
lem from this perspective suggests that the strong plausibility that discrimination 
against the old seems to enjoy is derived from the assumption that we should give 
exclusive concern to the diachronic interests of persons. That is to say, to the dia-
chronic interests we each have either to reach a fair innings or to enjoy an equal 
level of opportunity as everyone else over our complete lives. But this exclusive 
concern for diachronic interests does not sufficiently recognize the dual nature of 
our self-interest.  
My  conclusion,  therefore,  is  that  to  be  effective  an  anti-ageist  argument 
should appeal to the idea that there are certain synchronic interests that have equal 
moral value irrespective of the chronological age of the individual who holds them. 
These interests ought to be protected for each person at each temporal period of his 
or her life. However, there is an important difficulty that arises from such an anti-A Fair Innings or a Complete Life 
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ageist defense. If there are two irreducible dimensions to our self-interest, dia-
chronic and synchronic, neither of which is fundamentally prior to the other, then 
there is no obvious way of determining which has precedence in any particular 
situation. This means that we would be left with a messy intuitionist balancing of 
the synchronic and diachronic interests of different people in any rationing deci-
sion-making process. And of course the rationing of resources will always be nec-
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